


~~SENSITIVE~~

CIA/SAVA /WVIND 700829



## WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

*Week Ending 29 August 1970*

**NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.**


*For the President Only*

~~Top Secret~~

# SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS

1968-1970


Weekly average for each month



APRIL - AUGUST 1970


Weekly data as reported

## US BATTLE DEATHS




rose to 63 from last week's  
3½ year low of 52.

## SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS




climbed to 196 from the 150  
of last week which was the  
lowest total since July of 1969.  
The official total will change  
as late reports are received  
and will be lower than the  
figures released to the press  
by the GVN.

## INFILTRATORS DETECTED IN PIPELINE




stand at two battalion-size  
groups, with an estimated  
combined strength of 1,140.  
The total number of infil-  
trators since 23 October 1969  
is now approximately  
65,000 - 66,500.

## ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS




rose to 807 but the figure  
is inflated due to 250 late  
reported antiaircraft firings  
included in this week's total.

## ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION



increased to 1,285 from  
last week's two year low  
of 1,055.

## SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS



as measured by the percentage  
of enemy killed by RVNAF  
forces rose slightly to 65%.

Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Enemy Activity

Enemy activity in South Vietnam remained low most of last week, taking a sharp upturn on 29 August. The increase consisted largely of indirect fire attacks in Military Region (MR) 2 and MR 4, but there were several sharp, isolated ground actions. There will probably be a further countrywide increase in the next few days, but the increase should continue to consist mainly of indirect fire attacks. Significant ground action could occur in northern MR 1 and southern MR 4.

In MR II, the Royal Lao Government (RLG) operation to recover a key site west of the Plain of Jars has faltered as poor weather continues to hamper reconnaissance and a government support attack has bogged down. In southeastern Xieng Khouang Province, however, RLG forces have successfully penetrated enemy territory and recovered three sites. In MR I, a four-battalion RLG force has reached an enemy supply cave northwest of Luang Prabang and begun destroying stores. MR III and MR V are quiet, while in MR IV the Bolovens Plateau remains hotly contested by both sides.

Combat activity continued to be characterized by widespread Communist harassment of Cambodian positions through small-scale attacks designed to keep government forces on the defensive. The enemy has applied some pressure on the outer defenses of Phnom Penh; but the capital itself has not been attacked, the city retains its outward calm, and Cambodian officials believe it is in no immediate danger, although rocket or mortar attacks are possible at any time. During the week, the Communists launched unsuccessful attacks against Romeas and near Lovek northwest of the capital and Prek Tameak to the northeast. Additionally, troop concentrations have been reported southwest of Phnom Penh, where the town of Srang was briefly overrun but retaken, and to the north in Kompong Thom and Kompong Cham Provinces.

Enemy Infiltration

Two new southward moving infiltration groups were detected during the past week, with an estimated strength of 570 each. This brings the total number of infiltrators since 23 October 1969 to approximately 65,000 - 66,500.

The North Vietnamese may be starting their dry season personnel infiltration campaign early. An intercepted message of 28 August from an infiltration-associated headquarters at Vinh stated that beginning 6 September until the end of the month, one group per day would be starting south. It is unclear if the new groups mentioned are replacements destined for South Vietnam, Cambodia, or an augmentation for transportation units in southern Laos. If the message proves to be an accurate reflection of North Vietnamese intentions and the "groups" referred to are the normal battalion-sized infiltration packets, this message suggests that as many as 14,000 men may be put into the pipeline during the remainder of September, an unprecedented number for this month. Normally, combat troops would not be expected to start moving south until late October, but this year the NVA, unlike previous years, did not withdraw their logistics units from Laos during the rainy season. The resultant saving in time needed to regenerate the apparatus could be reflected in an early renewal of personnel infiltration.

South Vietnam Developments

Elections were held on 30 August for half (30 seats) of South Vietnam's Senate. As prescribed in the Constitution, candidates campaigned as members of ten-man slates, all of which had to run at large in nation-wide voting to pick the three winning slates. Unofficial returns indicate that the pro-government slate, headed by Senator Huynh Van Cao, has won the highest number of votes, closely followed by the oppositionist slate of Vu Van Mau. The third winning slate, comprising generally responsible southern independents, was headed by Senate Chairman Nguyen Van Huyen. Thieu's overall degree of support in the Senate has not materially changed, though members of Mau's slate will probably give the government considerable static

and are unlikely to look with favor on various government-proposed economic decrees now before the legislature. Mau's slate was backed by the militant An Quang Buddhists, and its success will probably encourage the Buddhists to become more actively engaged in anti-government politics, as well as provide a core of oppositionists around which anti-Thieu elements could organize. On the other hand, the victory of Mau's slate will probably strengthen the GVN's overall image since its victory provides what most Vietnamese will regard as prima facie evidence that the election was essentially honest and unrigged. The low-key campaign and lack of clear-cut issues resulted in a turnout of only 70 percent of the voters compared with 83 percent three years ago.

#### Communist Developments

The North Vietnamese regime is apparently engaged in a special recruitment effort aimed at expanding its armed forces. Party First Secretary Le Duan told high-ranking military officers in early August to go "all-out" to strengthen the armed forces, according to a Radio Hanoi report. In mid-August, Defense Minister Giap reminded Party leaders that Hanoi's "people's war" strategy implies universal mobilization -- that everyone should belong to some kind of military organization. These exhortations have been accompanied by increased propaganda in recent weeks urging young people to join the army. While the North Vietnamese may be expanding their military manpower base in anticipation of more intense fighting over the short run, it seems more likely that they are moving to ensure the availability of manpower from such organizations as the militia to meet the needs of a protracted struggle. Hanoi may also believe that increased mobilization will provide a more efficient means of organizing the available labor force for economic projects.

~~Top Secret~~